



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Morocco and U.S. Bases

by Benjamin Rivlin

Morocco's demands that the United States give up its five military air bases, accompanied by a deepening crisis in that country, confront the United States with a serious situation in North Africa.

The status of the one Navy and four Air Force bases, which the United States built by agreement with France when the French ruled Morocco as a protectorate, has been in doubt ever since Morocco achieved independence in 1956. The Franco-American bases agreement was not submitted to the Moroccan sovereign, Mohamed V, for approval, and consequently the Moroccan nationalists have denied the validity of the agreement and its binding quality upon independent Morocco. After independence, Morocco did not succeed to France's obligations under the Franco-American bases agreement, although it did assume most other obligations resulting from international treaties concluded by France in its name during the protectorate regime. It therefore became necessary for the United States to start afresh in negotiating with the Moroccan government over bases which already existed on Moroccan territory.

At the outset it appeared that Morocco was

prepared to reach an accord with the United States if it could also obtain an agreement on substantial American capital investment in Morocco. However, negotiations were delayed for some time over the role France was to play in them. Technically, under the terms of the Franco-American agreement, the bases in Morocco were French, and France insisted on participating in the negotiations. The Moroccan government ruled out any tripartite discussions and apparently won its point by the time Mohamed V visited the United States toward the end of 1957. The joint statement issued at that time by the White House indicated that the two governments were engaged in negotiations and would meanwhile proceed on the basis of a provisional solution pending conclusion of an agreement. The statement also referred to the "readiness" of the United States to aid Morocco "to stabilize and expand its economy." Thus a year ago it seemed that the issue of the bases was on its way to resolution and that, in general, relations between Morocco and the United States were being strengthened.

Within the year, however, the situation has radically altered. Not only have the prospects

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of maintaining United States bases in Morocco been dissipated, but the danger has arisen that Morocco may be alienated from the United States and the West. This new development has been precipitated by a combination of the steadily worsening economic situation in Morocco, its growing political instability and the impact of events in France, Algeria and the Middle East.

It is now two years since Morocco gained its independence, and the country has found it extremely difficult to stabilize itself economically and politically. Morocco's difficulties are due to a variety of factors—the lack of trained personnel, the uneven stages of development of the urban and rural inhabitants, the heterogeneity of the population, the enormity of the task of bringing about economic improvement and development and, most important, the Algerian civil war.

Morocco's Mounting Problems

This war has had a crucial effect on Moroccan affairs for it has impeded efforts to cope with the country's internal difficulties. It has prevented the normalization of relations between Morocco and France, which, according to the independence agreements of March 1956, were to be founded on the principle of "interdependence." Among other things, this meant that the close economic relations which had been built up during the protectorate between Morocco and France would be maintained and that France would provide most of the technical assistance

and financial aid for Morocco's program of economic development. Due to the Algerian war the promise of these agreements has not been fulfilled, because France has been reluctant to grant Morocco economic and financial aid as long as Rabat supports the rebel cause in Algeria.

Unwilling and unable to turn away from their Algerian brothers, Moroccans have sought economic aid elsewhere, including the United States. Although this country has extended some economic aid—\$20 million for 1957-58 and \$30 million for 1958-59—it has not stepped in to fill the gap left by the failure of French aid to materialize. Until now, the United States has been reluctant to undermine France's priority of interest in Morocco, notwithstanding the bases and the assurances it had given about its readiness to help stabilize and expand the Moroccan economy.

During the past year the American bases have been increasingly linked in the Moroccan mind with the presence of French and Spanish troops in Morocco and other vestiges of "colonialism." Moderate political leaders, until now in control of Morocco's government, have been criticized for failure to cope with the country's economic plight because they pursued a policy too soft on "colonialism" by being too friendly to France and the United States. Fearful of losing popular support, conservative and moderate elements have joined in demanding the evacuation of all foreign troops from Morocco—American, as well as

French and Spanish. It should be borne in mind that Moroccans do not view the bases in the same way as do American officials. To talk to Moroccans about the "defense of the free world" is meaningless, for they do not share our belief in the danger of international communism. During the past year the Moroccan government has characterized its foreign policy as one of "free international cooperation and nondependence." According to *Al Istiqlal*, the organ of Morocco's leading political party, "the existence of the American bases is incompatible with Morocco's policy of nondependence."

Rejection of U.S. Bases

In the more recent American-Moroccan negotiations the United States has accepted the principle of eventual evacuation of the bases but has asked for a period of between five and seven years to bring its operations to a close. This position has apparently proved unacceptable to the Moroccans, for on November 18 Mohamed V called for "total and unconditional" evacuation of the bases. The problem of American bases is not restricted to Morocco. Evacuation of bases in one part of the world will most certainly affect bases in other parts; but to stand pat in the face of mounting disaffection among the populations of the countries in which the United States has military installations is perhaps to court greater disaster in the field of foreign policy.

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Nuclear Armaments and Germany

There is a chance that Moscow's dramatic move to strangle West Berlin can be the dynamite breaking up the German log jam. It all depends on the West's reaction to Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's note of November 27 and on Moscow's reaction to the reaction of the West.

The United States does not have to relinquish any of its present policy positions to agree to sit down with the Russians and discuss with them the whole broad issue of Germany and European security—as well as Berlin. It can still insist that there will be no sellout of West Berlin or surrender of West Germany to Communist domination. It can still argue that there must be a free democratic election in both Germanys as the basis for a united German government.

Actually this may be the last chance for Moscow and the West to talk about Germany and/or Central Europe as a whole. For it is no secret, first, that Washington will soon be supplying West Germany with nuclear weapons; and, second, that West Germany is fast being integrated militarily into NATO's combined defense arrangement. When both those things have happened, then the East-West German deadlock is expected to become a solid freeze. At the same time the United States, which hopes to effect savings in its military budget by reducing land forces, is becoming more and more dependent on nuclear armaments.

That is why, even though Washington officially has not changed its policy line on either Berlin or on German reunification (and shows no sign of changing), the capital still echoes to talk of "disengagement," of "German neutralization," of Cen-

tral European demilitarization. There are officials here who do not want to discard those ideas definitely without being doubly, triply, sure that however great their merit, their dangers are not considerably greater.

The choice for Germany, then—if there really is a choice—seems to be either continued division or membership in some broader Central European organization. A neutralized, isolated, united Germany is also a possibility, but this is academic in view of the stand on German reunification taken by Moscow, as well as the West. Germany's continued division, including a divided Berlin, would commit the world to a perpetual crisis situation—with the United States constantly teetering on a Soviet-created brink. But at least that situation would keep West Germany out of Moscow's clutches—although at the same time perpetuating East Germany as a Soviet satellite.

German Policy Under Review

The great danger to any official freewheeling or exploratory thinking about Germany's future is, of course, that if any unorthodox views which are being considered ever became known, there would be no end of trouble. Therefore, while the technicians study various plans or proposals, the front-room officials have to deny positively and repeatedly that alternatives are being considered.

All of this means that George F. Kennan's views on disengagement, expressed in his Reith lectures for the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1957, are having a modest revival in Washington. The Rapacki plan

is also receiving renewed attention. The idea of neutralizing Germany, not separately, but rather as a part of a larger economic, even political, unit in Europe is now being explored.

Mr. Khrushchev hinted at Russia's willingness to have the United Nations take part in the establishment of West Berlin as a "free city." Some diplomatic quarters here see the possibility that UN troops might play a larger role and police a much wider area—an area that could include the whole of Central Europe.

Other Choices for Germany

In other words, if German unification is out (since neither Moscow nor the West will agree on the terms of reunification), the choice lies between carving Germany up (that is, leaving it carved up) and incorporating it into a larger European organization. What Moscow would not accept for Germany as a whole, it might possibly accept for a Europe joined under a security treaty. At least, some argue here, it might be worth finding out what Moscow would accept concerning Germany and a demilitarized zone.

Now that Moscow has opened the door to negotiations on West Berlin, there is nothing to prevent the West from pushing it still farther open by asking for broader exploratory, even regional, talks. While 99 people out of 100 here would say there is no real chance of gaining anything from such a venture in diplomacy, still, even the slimmest chance is believed to be worth pursuing.

It is with this thought in mind that the whole German question is now being reviewed in Washington.

NEAL STANFORD



Will Alliances Keep the Peace?

The Berlin crisis, precipitated on November 10 by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev when he declared that "the time has come to give up the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin" and that Russia "will hand over" its activities there to East Germany, is the greatest test to which the NATO alliance has been subjected since its conclusion in 1949. For Berlin, divided by post-World War II agreements between the victorious Big Four, is kingpin and symbol of a Germany still divided into two parts—West Germany, originally occupied after 1945 by the United States, Britain and France, but a sovereign federal republic since 1949; and East Germany, originally occupied by the U.S.S.R., and so still regarded by the West although it was proclaimed in 1949 as the German Democratic Republic, whose government has been recognized by a number of states, among them Communist China and Yugoslavia. And divided Germany, in turn, is a symbol of Europe's continued division between East and West, with their hostile alliances—the Warsaw Pact and the NATO pact.

For ten years the two rival blocs have maintained an uneasy yet seemingly stable balance of force. Both sides have repeatedly urged the reunification of Germany, but each on terms known to be unacceptable to the other. The maintenance of the postwar German *status quo*, however unsatisfactory to the Germans and potentially dangerous for the erstwhile allies, seemed to have become a fixed feature of Europe's landscape—even though, in the meantime, the United States has

endeavored to alter the *status quo* of Eastern Europe, and the U.S.S.R. that of the Middle East and Asia, in both cases without resort to war.

Europe Once More in Flux

Now with the Continent once more in flux the West must rethink the policy NATO should adopt under fast-changing conditions. Will the alliance system weather the new storm over Berlin?

Actually, the crisis was precipitated by the West's decision to strengthen NATO through the proposed expansion of West Germany's rearmament. This was to be accomplished in two ways: the provision of tactical atomic arms for the West German forces by the United States; and the installation of intermediate range ballistic missiles in West Germany for use by United States forces. From the point of view of the West these two measures represent legitimate and necessary reinforcement of NATO against both the nuclear-weapon strength of the U.S.S.R. and its continuing superiority in land forces. From the point of view of Russia, as well as of Poland and Czechoslovakia, all of which, in varying degrees, had suffered grievously from German conquest, these measures represent a new and intolerable threat to their security and economic development.

The issue between the Soviet bloc and the West is thus not Berlin, but the future role of the two Germans in the existing balance of armed power. The West wants to retain West Germany (and West Berlin), with 53,692,000 people, its booming industrial economy, its high standard of living and its pro-Western

orientation within the NATO alliance, reinforcing it with the latest weapons and expanding its freedom to construct new armaments. It also hopes that eventually East Germany (and East Berlin), on the basis of free elections, will join West Germany, and that the reunited nation, with a population of 71,213,000, will remain in NATO.

The U.S.S.R., which on this point is strongly supported by Poland and Czechoslovakia, is determined to prevent, first, the further arming of West Germany and, second, a reunification of West and East Germany which would restore a powerful military nation in Central Europe now backed—as it was not before World War II—with the military, industrial and financial might of the United States. The Soviet bloc, now that it has achieved a high degree of industrialization and scientific development, might consider itself a match for a reunited, and even remilitarized, Germany, but not—at least for the immediate future—for a reunited remilitarized Germany allied with the United States. The Russians have made it clear that the only condition under which the U.S.S.R. would consider reunification is that unity be preceded by West Germany's withdrawal from NATO and the neutralization of the reconstituted state.

Thus in the tug of war which is going on about the future of Germany, West and East each wants to change the balance of armed power in its favor.

Today, however, in contrast to 1945, and even to 1949, the Germans are claiming a voice in the deter-

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Laos: Case Study of U.S. Foreign Aid

by Franklin J. Leerburger

Franklin J. Leerburger, a consulting engineer, has been an active consultant to privately owned public utilities in the United States, to state agencies and also to such governmental programs as FOA, ICA and MSA, in which capacity he has rendered reports on many foreign countries, among them Vietnam and Laos, which he has just visited.

Laos is a part of that region of Southeast Asia loosely designated as Indochina. It is a landlocked region bordering on Communist China and North Vietnam, as well as on the friendly nations of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. There is sufficient arable land—10 percent of the total—to meet the essential food requirements of some 2 million Laotians. The climate is such that traditional tropical housing can be readily constructed. There are no railroads and few highways, all of which are substandard. Communication systems are almost completely absent, even within the capital city of Vientiane. Sanitary and water supply facilities are generally primitive. There are a few airfields and grass landing strips, making limited air transport possible. Truck transport from the country's single tin mine to Saigon, a distance of less than 1,000 kilometers, involves round-trip time of about two weeks. The output of the tin mine and the export of agricultural and forest products constitute an export total equivalent to about \$1 million.

Energy resources, including falling water and fossil fuels, have not been thoroughly investigated, and except for wood and charcoal, all fuel must be imported. The bulk movement of petroleum products involves shipments of 200-liter drums 500 miles by rail from Bangkok to a northern railhead in Thailand and successive truck and river movements, with intermediate manual effort, to reach towns in Laos.

The leadership of the government is in the hands of Laotians, only a

few of whom have received some advanced education in France. There are some French technicians and advisers available, but there is a desperate shortage of personnel having even an elementary education at almost all levels of government. In 1952 there were only 35,000 children enrolled in school. The low level of literacy and the wide prevalence of debilitating diseases operate to slow the tempo of life in Laos.

Reasons for U.S. Aid

United States foreign aid, begun in the post-World War II period, appealed to Americans as an expression of their deep-rooted sympathies for other peoples struggling to reach a reasonably secure way of life in which to express themselves in dignity and independence. Past American experience in less-developed areas has been the result of overseas activities by private corporations to search for and develop mineral and petroleum resources, of church missionaries and of public health and educational institutions.

Successful foreign aid, however, requires much more than congressional authorization and financing. It demands that Americans go into the field to execute related directives. It requires, in addition, that these people be specially qualified for their work. Foreign aid has had to be initiated by our government, which has had to adopt new rules and regulations to administer it. Procedures and personnel have had to be selected, with consideration not only for the needs of the job in hand, but also for the minimizing of criticism

from Congress and from the press. The avoidance of criticism involves procedures to insure against the selection of contractors and of personnel subject to political pressures, against misuse of funds, against the corruption of foreign government officials and of our own, against errors of judgment, and against errors in design and the execution thereof.

This negative approach involves checks and balances and tends to result in avoidance of courageous personal decisions in favor of committee consensus. Decisive prompt action has therefore been difficult to achieve. Whether our government could do better under circumstances other than the undemocratic atmosphere of war is an unanswerable question. It might be expected, however, that within the handicapping framework of checks and balances and committee-formed decisions the best qualified and most imaginative officials would be set to the tasks and that private industry-wide organizations would be approached to pick up those activities to which our necessarily cumbersome government operations are ill-suited. Unfortunately, the selection of personnel has not been uniformly consistent with these requirements.

United States aid to Laos began in 1951 as a part of a consolidated program of assistance to the former French-Indochinese states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. After full independence was achieved by the latter in January 1955, separate programs were developed, which for Laos amounted to \$135 million in the period 1955-57. The following is

quoted from an official statement and suggests the emphasis on military aspects rather than on economic.

"... for overriding political and military considerations the United States is presently supporting [security deletion] a Lao army of approximately 25,000 men at a cost of over \$25 million a year. . . . More than 85 percent of the local currency resulting from the United States dollar aid was programed for this purpose."

Because local currency could not be generated quickly enough, ICA provided the greater part of aid in cash grants. About 70 percent of the \$135 million, or \$95 million, has been in cash grants. In addition, \$25 million worth of commodity imports have been financed, using established procedures for generating local currency, that is, procurement authorizations for financing the import and sale of commodities. Prospective purchases are paid for at the rate of 35 kips (Laos currency) per United States dollar. However, the actual consignment and delivery of goods to Laos have been difficult to control because of the geography of the country and its poor transportation facilities and intercountry connections. Assurance that goods would not be unloaded en route, stolen or re-exported after arrival has been a major task in preventing the realization of undue profit stemming from the nonofficial value of the kip, approximating 100 to the dollar.

Methods of gathering statistics, although introduced by French administrators, were never accurately followed by the overworked, understaffed and poorly trained government agencies. Nevertheless, the published data of the Ministry of Finance shows that imports equivalent to \$35 million in 1956 correspond to a ratio 28 times that of exports for the same period. The care with which imports are licensed may be questioned, judging from an ex-

amination of the *Bulletin Statistique du Laos* for 1956, which indicates that about half the value of imports is represented by rice, textiles, motor vehicles, clocks, watches, musical instruments, shoes, hats and umbrellas.

Problems of Recruitment

The importance of encouraging a vigorous and dynamic economy in Laos is, of course, related to the desire of the United States to support the independence of friendly peoples and to frustrate Communist efforts at subversion which, in the absence of positive economic improvement, tend to flourish in formerly colonial regions. But our emphasis has been largely on military and political, rather than on economic, aid, as was said above. We have had great difficulty with this whole problem, much of which is due to continuing obstacles in recruiting Americans of appropriate education, training, stamina and resourcefulness to staff the operation. Moreover, long-range economic planning based on more than year to year budgeting has not been possible for our government, which depends on annual congressional appropriations.

Even if the foregoing criteria for recruitment were met, there would be the added complication of persuading individuals who have appropriate experience to take up duties in an exhausting climate and in what might be considered a hardship post with respect to sanitary, water and food conditions. Actually, successful administration of such an aid program as this demands a degree of dedication which is rare enough under the best of conditions.

Problems of Administration

The Laotians have had little experience in economic matters and in administering a modern government. The United States, on the other hand, is itself inexperienced in

administering foreign aid in non-Western areas. Not only does the American government have to compete with industry and other institutions in the recruitment of appropriately skilled, schooled and experienced personnel dedicated to the job at hand, but it is frequently handicapped by the legal and regulatory requirements regarding salaries, fringe benefits and job security.

The standards of finance and of economics which guide the operations of our own highly industrialized society are not of general usefulness in converting a former colonial and underdeveloped society into a modern economy. Bankers, economists and engineers have been sent to study, report and manage the American program overseas, guided by the American ideal of free private competitive effort. The application of this ideal to an underdeveloped society is sound enough as a future goal but does not necessarily fit the immediate needs of such a people as those of Laos, beset by hostile neighbors, by virulent diseases, by elementary problems of government and by the absence of a corps of trained personnel.

The economics of transition from simple agrarian pursuits to partial industrialization is obviously different from the economics of a highly organized industrial society. In the initial stages of such transition, educational programs, public health projects, hospital construction, water works, sanitary facilities, road nets, communication systems, power supply, and so on, cannot pay back the investment, or pay a return in accordance with ultimate economic criteria. Yet in Laos all these must be brought to fruition simultaneously with, if not prior to, industrial advancement.

For the foreseeable future, any investment must actually be in the Laotian people. Investment in a peo-

ple has generally not occurred in the prior experience of most of our government's administrators, nor has it been a part of the experience of most of the economists, accountants and engineers engaged for the purpose.

In general the aid given by the United States has been for projects, goods and services requested by the Lao government, with such advice and limitations as American officials have been able to bring to bear without infringing on the prerogatives and sovereignty of this free and independent host. Giving advice to and placing limitations on free exercise of choice on the Laotians are delicate and sensitive activities at best, and when these difficulties are compounded by a reborn nationalism, they tend to encounter obstacles that are almost insuperable.

In making engineering studies of the economic feasibility of projects the usual criteria are observed, namely, that projected revenues must be sufficient to cover all costs of operation, in addition to the return of the capital funds over a period of years and a return on the unamortized balance each year. In Laos, where there is a wide disparity between official and open market rates of exchange, the usual economic justification for repayable loans in any foreign exchange may not be achieved. In such a situation, when a market must be created out of wants not yet fully expressed and paid for out of means not yet generated, the prospect that private enterprise will find any investment in Laos sufficiently attractive to underwrite its capital requirements is extremely doubtful. If this lack of attractiveness is to be overcome government guarantees and even subsidies are required, which would rob any project of its most important private enterprise characteristic.

Under the circumstances long-

term American government involvement in capital requirements has been the only alternative. It is, however, futile to believe that even with such involvement the economy of Laos can be made viable in any short-run period. To achieve viability, time and long-term medical aid, industrial training and the gradual conversion of a simple agricultural society to a partly industrialized one will be required. For these reasons American engineers will have to be given new and different standards by which to judge the economic feasibility of projects in Laos. For example, the present price for the small amount of electric energy now available in the country approximates the equivalent of 30 cents per kilowatt-hour. This is about ten times the average cost of electricity in the United States.

Measure of Industrialization

Production of electricity is a measure of industrialization. Laos produces annually slightly more than one kilowatt-hour per capita, whereas the analogous figures for 1956 for Taiwan, Japan and the United States were 221, 732 and 3,393, respectively. While it is true that the contemporary economy of the United States has thrived on an abundant supply of reliable electric energy which has gradually decreased in price over the years, it is not true that such supply is the single most important factor in the success of our economy. When electricity first became available here it was not abundant, nor reliable, nor low-priced, and yet our economy flourished. Laos will not be deterred by insufficient electricity at excessive cost unless the increase in supply and decline in cost fail to keep step with the development of the people's industrialization, health improvement and training.

American foreign aid to Laos has been successful in the sense that the

people are still independent and are able, in a remarkable way, to adapt themselves to the difficulties and hardships of their geographic and political situation without embracing the delusively inviting blandishments of North Vietnam and of mainland China. American foreign aid, however, has been slow and costly in the sense that it has been based on overemphasis on rules, regulations, committee decisions and on the related absence of imaginative and determined decision-making. The management of foreign aid to Laos has been badgered and buffeted by itinerant professional and amateur critics who have rarely been constructive or even helpful in answering the question, Can democratic governmental techniques be implemented with sufficient rapidity by the type of personnel available for government service to offset the blows of the Communists as they turn and twist and shift their ground? On this point testimony before congressional committees has been illuminating. It may be that in the future much greater dependence will have to be placed on private initiative and effort, in spite of the obvious difficulties in encouraging them, if Laos is to receive the aid that is needed in such quantities and on such schedules as will insure successful economic growth.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Charles Bildeau, Somlith Pathammavong and LeQuang Hong, *Compulsory Education in Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam*, Paris, UNESCO, 1955; "International Cooperation Administration Replies to Criticisms of the Foreign Aid Program," for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 14, 1958; Thomas J. McNeil, "Foreign Aid Failings," *Engineering News Record*, September 18, 1958; Haynes Miller, "A Bulwark Built on Sand," *The Reporter*, November 13, 1958; *Mutual Security Program in Laos*, Hearings before Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 2nd session, May 7 and 8, 1958, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958; Barbara Ward, "Economic NATO for One Billion," *The New York Times Magazine*, October 19, 1958.

Spotlight

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mination of their own destiny. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a staunch supporter of the West, although expressing hope for ultimate unification, has been in no hurry to press for it, fearing that it might be achieved only at the cost of eventual neutralism, estrangement from the West and drift toward the Soviet orbit. Both the Christian Democratic chancellor and the Social Democratic mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt (who is regarded by Bonn as too belligerent toward Moscow), have urged the Western allies to stand fast against any concessions to the U.S.S.R. and any negotiations with East German spokesmen which might be interpreted as recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

Yet West Germany itself has not hesitated to enter into relations with East Germany and, even after the outbreak of the Berlin crisis, signed a trade treaty with Pankow, with which it has been doing business for several years. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats, although agreeing with Adenauer on the need to keep West Berlin free, are not afraid of accepting Moscow's proposal for a confederation of the two Germanys, contending that West Germany would prove the stronger attraction of the two and that fears of a Communist take over are groundless. The Social

Democrats favor a summit conference on the German question with the U.S.S.R., and Chancellor Adenauer, who had hitherto been loath to share power with the Opposition, started consultations with Erich Ollenhauer, chairman of the Social Democratic party, on December 1 in an effort to mold a national policy on West Berlin. The Social Democrats, however, while agreeing with Adenauer on the need to defend West Berlin, have made it known that they will support him only if he changes his views on German unification and rearmament.

The Rapacki Plan

Now that the question of German reunification has been reopened, new interest is being expressed in the plan for denuclearization and neutralization of Germany and Eastern Europe first proposed in the autumn of 1957 by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki. This plan, which aroused the attention of the British Labor party and of many European experts, had been bluntly rejected by the United States on the ground that it would deprive the West of nuclear weapons while, at the same time, leaving intact the vastly superior conventional forces of the Soviet bloc. At that time, some students of the Rapacki plan believed that it offered an opportunity not only to reunite the two Germanys, but also to re-

move Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. In November 1958 Rapacki, on a visit to Norway, presented a revised plan which would provide for gradual reduction of conventional weapons as well as for the banning of nuclear weapons in both Germanys and in Eastern Europe, and for a system of inspection.

This revised plan may now receive consideration in Washington, where for the first time there is serious talk of a possible compromise based on a phased withdrawal of Soviet and Western troops from Germany and a prohibition of the nuclear arming of Germany for a stipulated number of years. Some officials are reported to believe that if devices of this sort were coordinated with an East-West agreement on inspecting a ban on nuclear test explosions and on machinery to avoid surprise attack, it might be possible to work toward a new security treaty for Europe. If the deadlock between the two blocs were thus broken, the gradual disappearance of alliances, rather than their rigid maintenance, might prove a signal for peace. Meanwhile, however, there is increasing danger that the German question may split the NATO allies within and among themselves.

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(The second of nine articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1959"—Reshaping Foreign Policy Amid Revolutions—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

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